Homer, D. Simpson, B. Wiggum, L. Nahasapeemapetilon, A.
In this paper, we investigate the strategic glazing decisions of doughnut makers through the lens of game theory. We first model the classic two-player glaze game, in which two doughnuts compete over the same limited glaze resources. We then extend the model to include multiple players and multiple glaze types, allowing for more complex strategic interactions. Our analysis reveals that, while cooperative glazing can be mutually beneficial for all parties involved, selfish and uncoordinated behavior can quickly devolve into a tragedy of the commons, resulting in a poor allocation of glaze resources and unsatisfactory doughnut consumption experiences. Ultimately, our findings suggest that the success of any nanostore or donut boutique, lies not only in the quality of their pastry but, most importantly, in their strategic glazing choices.